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human behaviour) or too loose
(encompassing any non-genetically
acquired trait). One solution has been to
dissect and define culture as the product of
a range of cognitive skills and motivations,
which may have their own independent
evolutionary histories. But what exactly are
the key components? Amongst biologically
oriented researchers the following features
appear to be particularly relevant: the
behaviour in question must be socially
acquired from an innovator, then
propagate in a group, and subsequently
remain stable across generations. If more
than one such behaviour is present,
preferably in different domains, then the
conglomerate qualifies as a culture
(Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). In this view,
the capacity for culture is not a monolithic
phenomenon, but the product of a
multitude of cognitive abilities and
motivational propensities, particularly to
socially learn behaviours and to transmit
them to others with or without
improvements. 
Do chimpanzees have culture?
Food washing of Japanese macaques
still features regularly in textbooks as a
classic example of animal culture,
although the relevance of these
observations has been questioned in
the more recent literature (Galef, 1992;
Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990). Food
washing is relatively common in
various monkey species, suggesting
that the behaviour seen on Koshima
may not be an invention, but part of
natural macaque behaviour. This is not
necessarily a deep problem because
cognitively sophisticated animals,
including humans, often only realise a
proportion of their full behavioural
capacity. For example, humans are
capable of more than a hundred
discrete speech sounds but speakers of
different languages only produce
fractions of them. A more serious
critique is that the transmission speed
of potato washing within the group was
very slow. This fact is more consistent
with the hypothesis that each group
member acquired the potato washing
behaviour on its own, rather than by
observing others (Galef, 1992). 
For chimpanzees, the notion of
‘culture’ appeared soon after researchers
began to study them in their natural
habitats in Africa (Goodall, 1973).
Chimpanzees are gifted tool users, and it
was soon found that different study groups
used different tool techniques to solve
similar problems (Boesch, 1996; McGrew,
1992). Nut cracking, termite fishing,
honey dipping, water sponging are just
some of the behaviours seen in the wild.
Although this diversity is undisputed, the
question of chimpanzee culture has
continued to remain controversial. The
debate has largely to do with whether the
key criteria for culture, as outlined before,
are met (Laland & Galef, 2009). In
particular, the main point of contention
concerns the learning mechanism
responsible for the observed behavioural
differences. East and West African
chimpanzees differ substantially in the
range of tools they use to gain access to
difficult foods. For example, West African
chimpanzees use hammers and anvils to
crack nuts, but this behaviour is not seen
in East Africa (Laland & Janik, 2006). 
Although such patterns are intriguing,
and indicative of cultural differences, they
could be the product of genetic or
ecological factors, rather than socially
learned behaviour. Biologically, West
African chimpanzees are a subspecies that
is genetically slightly different from the
East African population (Goldberg &
Ruvolo, 1997). Although the genetics
hypothesis is difficult to rule out, it is not
very plausible that genetic variation is
responsible for the observed behaviour
differences across groups. Captive
chimpanzees or bonobos can acquire nut-
cracking and other tool-use techniques
with relatively little effort, regardless of
their genetic background (Gruber et al.,
2010). A more serious critique concerns
the role of the environment. For instance,
it is possible that there is
something special about West
African forests that makes it
more likely for chimpanzees to
discover nut-cracking
individually and regardless of
what others are doing (Tennie
et al., 2009). Acquired
behaviour, in other words,
could be the product of trial-
and-error learning, and this
would not qualify as cultural
behaviour. How can such
critique be addressed?
Experiments with wild
primates
Other researchers have
advocated the use of field
experiments to produce more
compelling evidence for
animal culture (e.g. Kendal,
2008). Until very recently,
fieldwork with great apes has
almost exclusively been
observational (Reader & Biro,
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Which components of our cognitive
architecture are part of our primate
heritage, and what is uniquely
human? Comparative studies of
non-human primates can provide
insights into earlier stages of
human evolution by revealing the
ancestral states. We address one
pillar of what it means to be
human, the capacity for culture.
Overall, there is good evidence –
from both laboratory groups and
more recent field studies – that
primates possess the key
ingredients for culture to various
degrees. But can a chimpanzee
disregard current cultural norms in
order to find optimal solutions to a
novel problem, or is this an ability
that emerged more recently in
human evolution?
How is it possible to investigate whatit was like to be an early human,considering that mental capacities
leave no direct traces in the archaeological
record? One promising avenue is the
study of ancient DNA. A draft sequence
of the Neanderthal genome is now
available (Green et al., 2010), which will
allow comparisons of genetic sequences
of modern humans with their sister
species, the Neanderthals, and with other
closely related primates. Unfortunately,
however, very little is still known about
how genes relate to the development and
regulation of normal behaviour and
cognitive functioning. Advances in
describing the cognitive capacities of early
humans will thus depend on progress
made in understanding how genetic
variation and cognitive differences are
linked. In the meantime, other disciplines
will have to provide the brunt of
evidence. 
A particularly successful approach has
been to compare the behaviour and
cognitive capacities of animal species that
are closely related to humans. The
comparative approach engenders
inferences about ancestral states by
contrasting the cognitive capacities of
humans with chimpanzees and bonobos,
our closest living relatives. The obvious
drawback is that humans and modern apes
derived from a shared ancestor that lived
several million years ago (Gagneux et al.,
1999; Stone et al., 2010), preventing
conclusions about the more recent
evolutionary history of humans.
With this in mind, we will address one
key feature of what it means to be human,
the capacity for culture. By describing how
the world looks through the eyes of our
closest living relatives, the chimpanzees,
we seek to generate insights into the
cognitive apparatus of the common
primate ancestor. Our goal is to determine
what parts of the human cultural mind
have shared primate roots and what has
evolved more recently in the human
lineage.
Back in 2008 in The Psychologist,
Rachel Kendal provided a comprehensive
overview of the question of animal culture
and outlined the main lines of argument in
this controversial debate. We first
summarise the major points before
reviewing some recent developments based
on field experiments with free-ranging
chimpanzees that shed new light on the
question of how humans evolved the
capacity for culture.
The biological roots of culture
Modern humans understand themselves
as cultural beings, but little is known
about how and why the capacity for
culture has evolved. Perhaps for this
reason, there has been long-standing
interest in the study of behavioural
traditions in animals, particularly
primates. Early work by Japanese
primatologists suggested that non-human
primates could develop simple forms of
behavioural traditions, or ‘culture’
(Imanishi, 1952). According to these
reports, a female Japanese macaque living
on Koshima Island invented a novel food
processing technique, washing potatoes in
water, a behaviour that first spread to
immediate family members and then
other group individuals (Hirata et al.,
2001; Kawai, 1965). Further behavioural
innovations were subsequently observed
to spread, which led to the notion that
non-human primates can develop group-
specific behavioural traditions. Is it
adequate to describe such phenomena as
‘culture’?
Surprisingly, it has been extraordinarily
difficult to define ‘culture’ in a way that is
not too narrow (only useful to describe
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How much cognitive is primate culture?
Do chimpanzees disapprove if another
does not follow a cultural norm?
Captive chimpanzees or bonobos can acquire nut-
cracking and other tool-use techniques with relatively
little effort, regardless of their genetic background
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In captive groups, a wealth of
experimental evidence has shown that
primates are prone to and capable of
various forms of social learning
(Whiten, 2010). For example, long-
tailed macaques are more likely to
manipulate wooden material than
other objects after observing a group
member raking apples into the
enclosure with a wooden stick, a form
of ‘stimulus enhancement’
(Zuberbühler et al., 1996).
Interestingly, individuals affected more
strongly by this simple form of social
learning were also more likely to learn
the tool-use technique themselves.
Laboratory chimpanzees can learn new
tool techniques, not only by watching
other group members, but also by
observing human demonstrators
(Herrmann et al., 2008). Although
such results are relevant, it is imperative
to eventually obtain evidence from free-
ranging individuals. One way to address
this is to artificially seed a novel behaviour
in a free-ranging primate group, monitor
whether it will spread both horizontally
within the group and vertically across
generations. Such study efforts are
currently under way.
Culture and cognition
Culture has a substantial impact on the
daily lives and behavioural decisions of
humans (Tennie, et al., 2009). Human
cognition, in other words, is ‘overridden’
by culture, but it is not clear whether
similar effects also govern chimpanzee
behaviour. To address this possibility, we
revisited members of the two
communities at Sonso and Kanyawara
and presented them with the same basic
task, honey trapped in small hole of a
fallen branch (Gruber et al., 2011). This
time, however, we also provided a
suitable tool, a 40cm branch of an
alstonia shrub, with all leaves removed
for half of its length, the ‘leafy stick’. This
tool could thus function in three different
ways, as a ‘stick’ (by inserting the bare
end), ‘brush’ (by inserting the leafy end)
or ‘leaf sponge’ (by removing and
chewing its leaves and inserting the
resulting sponge). 
We found that, at Sonso, all subjects
who seized the tool proceeded to detach
the leaves with their lips, discard the stick
afterwards, and produce a sponge. Most,
however, ignored the tool, although two
manufactured a leaf-sponge from the
surrounding vegetation. At Kanyawara, all
subjects who seized the tool proceeded to
insert its bare end into the cavity to
retrieve honey. No one manufactured a leaf
sponge and no one used it as a brush.
From those who ignored the tool, a
majority manufactured a stick tool from
the surrounding vegetation. 
We then tested whether the Sonso
chimpanzees could learn stick use if they
encountered the test tool already inserted
into the hole. From a human perspective,
this made one functional feature of this
tool particularly obvious. Although many
individuals interacted with the provisioned
tool, no one used it to extract honey.
Individuals either simply touched the tool
or they retrieved and discarded it without
further interest, sometimes after smelling
or consuming residual honey off it. Some
others completely ignored the stick and
inserted their fingers into the hole,
although one individual proceeded to
manufacture a leaf-sponge to extract
honey.
In sum, although we presented the tool
so that its functional properties were
particularly evident, no Sonso chimpanzee
was able to perceive these features. Much
to our surprise, these results do not
support the widespread notion of
chimpanzees possessing advanced
capabilities in the physical realm. What is
even more startling is that in captivity,
chimpanzees generally perform very well
in tasks requiring physical cognition,
equivalent to both orang-utans and human
infants (Herrmann et al., 2007). How do
we interpret this puzzling difference
between wild and captive chimpanzees?
We think that wild chimpanzees appear to
rely heavily on previously acquired
knowledge, and this may restrict them
from experimenting with new techniques,
a kind of cognitive conservatism
(Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini &
Whiten, 2008). Cognitive conservatism
may also explain why evidence for
cumulative culture, the ability to improve
existing techniques which is a landmark of
human culture, currently only consists of
insubstantial anecdotal reports in wild
chimpanzees. 
This is not to say that chimpanzee tool
use cannot be very complex. Observations
in the Goualougo Forest of the Congo
Republic have shown that, when fishing
for termites, individuals can use one tool
to break into the nest, before using another
tool that is more suitable for fishing,
raising the possibility that chimpanzees
can alter existing techniques to increase
complexity (Sanz & Morgan, 2007).
Despite such observations, chimpanzee
cultures may generally lock their carriers
into group-specific behaviours, which may
prevent them from developing further
improvements to existing problems.
Primate origins of the human
cultural mind
Our review has shown that evidence for
culture, if defined in more general terms,
is abundant in non-human animals.
However, human cultures are not just
conglomerates of socially learned
behavioural traditions. Instead, humans
attach meanings to socially learned
activities, which can become part of social
norms that are enforced and policed by
other group members. With culture being
mentally entrenched, external events can
be perceived in culturally specific ways
with profound impacts on daily decisions.
Humans are cognitively channelled by
their culture, and seemingly rational and
objective analyses can be biased by the
specifics of a cultural background
(Casasanto, 2008; Chiao & Ambady,
2007; Haun & Rapold, 2009; Haun et al.,
2006; Levinson et al., 2002). Whether
similar processes take place in non-
human primates is an equally open
question. 
2010). Although this commitment to
observe and report on the natural
behaviour of our closest relatives has
produced much progress (e.g. Lonsdorf,
2010) observational data are often
unsuitable for strong conclusions about
the causality of behavioural phenomena.
Experiments are necessary to clarify the
causes and consequences of behaviour,
but they tend to be difficult to carry out
with free-ranging animals. What type of
experiments would discriminate between
the main hypotheses, i.e. whether
behaviour has been culturally transmitted
rather than discovered by individual
learning in response to a specific
environment?  
Meaningful results have been obtained
with translocation experiments of
individuals between populations or of
populations between sites (reviewed in
Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). This way, a
subject in possession of a novel behaviour
can be introduced to a naive population to
investigate whether the behaviour spreads.
Conversely, exchanging populations
between habitats will allow one to assess
the impact of the environment on the
behavioural repertoire of individuals.
Although such experiments have been
done successfully with fish, for logistic and
ethical reasons they are not feasible with
wild chimpanzees.
To address these issues, we carried out
a series of field experiments with several
East African chimpanzee communities. We
first chose two groups in Uganda, the
Sonso community of Budongo Forest and
the Kanyawara community of
neighbouring Kibale Forest. Both forests
have similar histories and were connected
until about 10,000 years ago but are now
separated by about 200 km (Gruber et al.,
2009; Reynolds, 2005). The experiment
built on previous reports, which had
revealed that the two communities differed
in their tool-use behaviour. The
Kanyawara chimpanzees regularly use
sticks to extract food from cavities, but
stick use has never been recorded in the
Sonso community, despite two decades of
continuous careful observations (Gruber et
al., 2009; Whiten et
al., 1999). However,
both Sonso and
Kanyawara
chimpanzees
sometimes produce
leaf sponges to
retrieve water from
tree holes. The
sponges are made by
ripping a bunch of
leaves from a nearby
bramble, putting
them into the
mouth, and chewing
them into a wadge,
which is then used
to absorb liquids
(Quiatt, 1994). By
choosing these two
groups that
belonged to the
same subspecies,
any explanation
based on differences
in genetic
endowment could be
ruled out from the beginning. Our
experiments were thus designed to address
the second foundation upon which the
chimpanzee culture claim rests, the
influence of the environment. 
In the experiment, members of both
communities were exposed to an identical,
but novel foraging task; liquid honey
trapped in a hole drilled vertically into a
large and naturally fallen horizontal tree
trunk. The hole was wide enough for
chimpanzees to insert two fingers, but not
shallow enough to retrieve any honey. 
Results were clear-cut. The Sonso
individuals tried to access the honey by
(unsuccessfully) inserting fingers into the
hole, and most soon gave up. However, a
few individuals persisted and proceeded to
manufacture a leaf sponge. They then
inserted this newly manufactured tool into
the cavity, which allowed them to extract
substantial amounts of honey. The
behaviour observed in the Kanyawara
community of neighbouring Kibale Forest
was very different. Upon encountering the
artificial beehive, most individuals almost
immediately manufactured a stick, which
allowed them to retrieve honey without
much difficulty. No individuals ever
produced a leaf sponge, even though this
was also part of their natural tool
repertoire. The most likely explanation for
this behavioural difference was that
individuals resorted to their already
existing knowledge, rather than to
individualistic ad hoc solutions to the
problem. 
Has this experiment resolved the
controversy surrounding chimpanzee
culture? Although we have demonstrated
that chimpanzees will recruit previously
stored knowledge when confronted with
novel problems, it is not clear whether this
knowledge has been acquired by
individual or social learning. Chimpanzees
spend the first 10 years of their lives in
almost constant contact with their mothers
and siblings (Goodall, 1986), suggesting
that social influences are strong and social
learning opportunities omnipresent.
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It has been argued that the human
capacity for culture is the product of
advanced social cognition, particularly
the ability to perceive others’ mental
states (Tomasello et al., 2005). In
humans, this ability is also directly
linked to language, a communication
device that appears to facilitate the
formation of categories of mental
states, but may as well be useful to
become conscious of their existence
(Carruthers, 2002). Although
chimpanzees understand others’ goals
and can make basic inferences, there is
no evidence that they are also able to
reflect upon their own mental states or
even understand others’ beliefs,
abilities that emerge in humans during
childhood (for a review, see Call &
Tomasello, 2008; but see also Crockford
et al., 2012). Being conscious of others’
mental states, however, appears to be a
key component for successful pedagogy
(Csibra & Gergely, 2011), a process that
plays a key role in the transmission of
cultural knowledge in humans.
In humans, cultural practices often
serve as powerful identity markers.
Members of both hunter-gatherer and
industrialised societies have strong views
on how to do things the ‘right’ way, often
in contrast to what other groups do
(Henrich et al., 2010). Would a Kanyawara
chimpanzee be surprised when watching a
Sonso individual producing a leaf-sponge
to retrieve honey? Would she be motivated
to propose her own solution, stick use, as
the most appropriate response to this
problem? Whether or not non-human
primates notice when other group
members carry out group-specific
behavioural traditions and whether they
are motivated to act on individuals that
deviate from such group-specific norms is
one of the current hot topics in primate
research (Perry, 2009). If results are
negative, then certainly this is not due to a
lack of group identity. Like most other
primates, chimpanzees can be very hostile
towards members of other communities,
with sometimes lethal consequences. This
extreme xenophobia may effectively
prevent them from observing members of
other groups, apart from during intergroup
conflicts. Arguably, humans are much
more tolerant towards outgroup members
than chimpanzees, presumably as the
result of an evolutionary trend towards
more cooperativeness with non-kin-related
individuals (Boyd & Richerson, 2006).
Although this enables human groups to
interact with each other more freely and
notice cultural differences, it is sometimes
precisely because of such cultural
differences that intergroup hostilities can
emerge.
As Darwin already suggested in 1871,
human and animal minds are unlikely to
differ fundamentally in kind. The studies
reviewed here are in line with this stance
by suggesting that Darwin’s hypothesis
should include the ‘cultural mind’, at least
of chimpanzees.
Additionally, we have
argued that addressing
questions of animal
culture in purely
behaviouristic terms is in
severe danger of
neglecting a key feature
of the phenomenon, the
cognitive experience of
the individual. Our
results suggest that there
is a deep cognitive side to
chimpanzee culture, a
point that has yet to be
empirically explored.
Current evidence suggests
that cultural behaviours in
chimpanzees is governed by
conglomerates of socially
acquired ‘ideas’; that is,
mental representations
derived from experience
with others that are used to generate
actions (Bryson, 2009). As a result,
chimpanzees appear to view the world
through a cultural filter, and this will
further determine what youngsters will be
exposed to during ontogeny. 
Finally, although good progress has
been made to close the gap between
chimpanzee and human cultures, much is
still not understood. Future research needs
to focus on the role and nature of social
learning in the wild. We have argued that
the focus should not be limited to
documenting the acquisition of behaviour
patterns, but should try to describe the
mental representations that individuals
acquire during the process. Answers to
these questions are likely to reveal how
our own cultural mind has emerged from
its primate roots. 
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